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Abstract
The concept of reasonability is key in Umberto Eco’s interpretive semiotics, where 
it enables the formation of a community of interpreters that avoids both extremes 
of fundamentalism and anarchy. Such concept, however, is not immune from the 
technological infrastructure in which interpretation takes place. In the digital sphere, 
the notion itself of community is deeply altered as a consequence of fundamen-
tal change in the very nature of connectedness and connections among members. 
Whereas in the pre-digital world, semantic communality would ground connected-
ness and the ensuing communities, in digital social networks syntactic communi-
ties prevail, where clusters of members emerge out of contagion and memetic force 
more than through sharing of actual semantic content. The passage from semantic 
to syntactic connectedness deeply affects the nature of communities and the ways in 
which they find cohesion. In the digital world, communities are not only syntactic 
more than semantic, but also quantitative more than qualitative, and negative more 
than positive: they take shape around what they oppose, more than around what they 
propose. The market is a fundamental force behind the technological framework of 
such new communities, since it engineers them so as to both monitor them and profit 
by their constant litigiousness.
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Social networks
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1 Introduction
Digital communities might seem—and are frequently presented by populisms—as 
freer than non-digital communities, but they are not. A democratic state parliament 
debates both on its laws and on the rules that are chosen as a framework to bring 
about such laws; digital parliaments, instead, let all—and not only their representa-
tives—discuss about everything, except about the digital framework of discussion 
itself, whose inner laws are actually invisible and untouchable to most. Perhaps, in 
the future, digital communities too will express a proper semiotic arena, in which 
not only meaning as content is discussed and negotiated, but also meaning as frame-
work. The current evidence about such process of negotiation, however, is more than 
discouraging. Digital communities let unreasonableness proliferate through various 
forms of contagion in which no kind of negotiation plays any role. The most diri-
ment difference between traditional communities and current digital communities, 
indeed, is that the latter seem to be completely uninterested—unlike the former—to 
any sort of community memory. They live in an eternal present that constantly flees 
toward a future but does not leave any traces if not in some remote servers, unex-
plored by anyone, or in ‘time-machines’ that produce no collective discourse.
Above all, no ritualization of memory exists in digital communities, as well as no 
established pattern to transform past interactions into guidelines for future negotia-
tion. A community without a structured memory uneasily gives rise to stable frame-
works of interpretive reasonableness, exactly insofar as these frameworks must tran-
scend the individual agency of intentional contributors and emerge, on the contrary, 
from the holistic functioning of the semiosphere. We do not abide by the grammar 
of our natural language because someone or somewhat explicitly decided so, but 
because myriads of micro-interactions, including those of our ancestors, have been 
deposited and distilled into a configuration that, despite the possibility of micro-var-
iations, changes, and playfulness, a community has come to accept as its standard. 
Unfortunately, at least thus far, such holistic mechanism of formation of a cultural 
memory seems not to take place in digital communities, which are constantly swept 
by the wind of the present.
2  Mystical Stereotypes
“To be connected with the whole”: what does it mean? This or similar sentences 
often occur in the discourse of various present-day spiritual trends. They circulate 
through the contemporary culture by means of sundry texts and media. Even more 
significantly, they turn into the many stereotypical fragments through which soci-
ety constructs its everyday discourse. “I feel connected with the whole” is a phrase 
that is often heard during night conversations among friends over a glass of wine or 
similia. It is necessary to investigate both the sociocultural and the semiotic meaning 
of affirmations of this kind, aiming at a more encompassing critique of the concept 
itself of connectedness, for it is instrumental in order to understand the nature of the 
community that the current digital sphere brings about. What does it actually mean, 
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“to be connected”? Delving into the semantic field of connection, connectedness, 
connectivity, interconnectedness, etc. is essential in an epoch in which the terms 
derived from it often constitute the linguistic and textual cornerstones of the prevail-
ing rhetoric of our times, a rhetoric according to which there would be a value in the 
passive status of “being connected” as well as in the active status of “connecting”.
The spiritual utopia of a permanent state of connectedness with the whole is not 
an invention of the era of digital social networks: in the past, human beings have 
expressed wishes and projects of total union of a similar kind in relation to tran-
scendence, to nature, or to humanity as a whole [1]. The concept, feeling, and rhet-
oric of connectedness that was formulated in relation to these different targets of 
complete unification were not constant but changed in relation to both the subject 
and the object of fusion. As a consequence, cultural semiotics must underline both 
continuities and discontinuities between these epochs and the current one: on the 
one hand, a subtle thread links the contemporary youngster that today, often stimu-
lated by substances of various kinds, expresses a wish of total connectedness and, 
on the other hand, seventeenth-century Spanish Catholic mystics voicing a similar 
desire of merging into the totality of God [2], or the recurring utopias for a universal 
language [3].
On the other hand, though, the two expressions significantly differ not only as 
regards the specific object and context of the connectedness that is wished for, but 
also and most significantly, as regards the discourse that promotes, describes, and, 
sometimes, performs such fusion. In a nutshell, if the rhetoric of total connectedness 
has existed for a long time, and expressed itself first and foremost in some spiritual 
trends in world religions—and later in the naturalistic utopias of Romanticism and 
post-Romanticism—the era of digital social networks has pushed this cultural trend 
to a both superior and inferior level: while turning mystical connectedness into a 
matter of technical algorithms, accessible to all, it has also placed this anthropologi-
cal drive of human beings into a marketing framework [4].
3  The Meaning of Connectedness
The essay that follows, then, works both at a diachronic and at a synchronic level. It 
retraces the current ‘connectedness fever’ to previous similar sociocultural manifes-
tations in human history, and simultaneously seeks to develop a synchronic typology 
of its discourses. Both operations must start from a semiotic reflection on what a 
connection is. The etymology of words is not equivalent to their semantics: the his-
tory of a word leads to its present usage but does not fully explain it, for the simple 
fact that speakers often ignore the history of words when they use them and some-
times even use them with a semantic content that contradicts their history. The ety-
mology of a word, however, offers clues about the main stages and switches marking 
its cultural history [5]. Most probably, the etymological core of the word “connex-
ion” is the proto-Indoeuropean root “*ned-”, which is conjectured to have covered 
the whole semantic area of “binding together”. This root can be derived from words 
such as the Sanskrit “nahyati”, meaning “binds, ties”; the Latin “nodus”, meaning 
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“knot”; the Old Irish “nascim”, meaning “I bind, I oblige”; and the Old English 
“net”, meaning “netting, network”.
The same kernel of meaning occurs in all these expressions, constituting, there-
fore, the semantic specificity of the abovementioned proto-European root. Such 
semantic kernel seeks to evoke a range of possible phenomenologies, which in turn 
constitute the perceptible manifestation of a basis of possible ontological situations. 
Here follows a formal description of the main features of both this ontology and 
the phenomenology to which it gives rise. First, there is no connection in absolute 
singularity. In order for one of the phenomenological situations inscribed in the root 
“*ned-” to take place, ontology must be posited as dual: there are at least two ele-
ments in reality, and these two elements appear as separated. The appearance of this 
separation, nevertheless, deserves further reflection. For two entities to manifest 
themselves as distinct, indeed, a potential of connectedness must already somehow 
linger between them. In other words, when two beings are thought of as separated, 
the thought itself of separation contains a potential for interconnection. Thinking at 
two separate entities at the same time is inevitably tantamount to envisage at least 
the negative possibility of their connection. “*Ned-”, therefore, refers to this idea of 
two or more separate entities whose separation is, however, perceived as temporary 
or, at least, not intrinsic.
4  Expansions and Contractions
From the perspective of cultural semiotics, it is especially crucial to consider how, 
in different epochs and societies, the range of connectedness expands or contracts 
according to forces that are both material and symbolical. Connecting two countries 
divided by a mountain range, for instance, was unconceivable for a long period of 
human history. In the presence of a frontier constituted by a mountain range, the 
two human communities separated by it were doomed to exist separately. The idea 
of their connection was not even envisageable, and any attempt at overcoming the 
gigantic obstacle mostly expressed itself in the individual endeavor of an explora-
tion, or in the aggressive initiative of an invasion [6]. Only the development of com-
plex technical means in late modernity (mainly from the 1830s on) allowed human 
beings to ‘pierce’ mountains and to establish permanent connections between two 
hitherto separated societies [7]. The engineering of tunnels not only allowed previ-
ously separated communities to interact on a regular basis, but also deeply trans-
formed the ontology of a mountain range. People divided by mountains are not any 
more cultural monads, but societies whose separation already invokes an effort of 
interconnection.
The same goes for other natural obstacles separating societies and, therefore, cul-
tures: the sea was, up to modern times in human history, an agent both creating and 
preserving a semantics of unredeemable separation: that which was beyond Hercu-
les’s Columns could not be possibly bridged, it was immune to any human project 
of connection [8]. Yet, technical advancements in the art of navigation transformed 
the phenomenology of separation by which the planet would appear to most of its 
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inhabitants: today, no sea is seen anymore as an agent of permanent seclusion. Given 
the appropriate navigation means, every shore in the world can be reached.
The expansion and the contraction of both the ontology and the phenomenology 
of potential connectedness does not depend only from material and technical cir-
cumstances. For instance, human beings do not have the technical means for reach-
ing distant astronomic destinations yet they do not, for that matter, currently cease 
to perceive them as potentially reachable [9]. Since the “giant step in humankind” 
of the moon-landing, the space is not seen as an obstacle anymore, as something 
that will always keep human beings apart from what is “out there”, but rather as a 
porous interspace, which advancement in technology will sooner or later be able 
to ‘pierce’ and ‘bridge’ as it was the case for mountains and oceans. Similarly, the 
way in which cultures stress rather the singularity of entities or their separation, 
and therefore their possible connection, responds also to a symbolical logic that is 
underpinned by material conditions but it is not completely determined by them. 
The interdependence between the materiality and the rhetoric of connection can also 
turn into independence, to such an extent that the former can actually progress to the 
detriment of the latter.
To give an example: technical developments in the flight industry and especially 
in the algorithms of pricing have led to the flourishing of low-cost flight compa-
nies, and to the consequent exponential increase in the number of journeys across 
country frontiers in Europe and elsewhere. Cities that would heretofore been per-
ceived as very distant in terms of space and traveling costs have become reciprocally 
approachable: young people of Madrid can now easily travel to Istanbul and vice 
versa. On the one hand, this technical and commercial development was already pre-
pared by some cultural conditions: the establishment and the successful running of 
ERASMUS, the European program for students’ exchange, for instance, had already 
prepared the sociocultural conditions that were subsequently matched by the tech-
nology and marketing of low-cost flying.
On the other hand, though, the material conditions of connectedness and the cor-
responding symbolical discourse do not always develop in parallel; while this essay 
is being written, for instance, Europe continues to cultivate an utopia of connec-
tion, and technical meanings to ensure progress toward such utopia are in constant 
improvement: the current generation of European young students, for example, is 
able to express itself in English as European lingua franca like no other previous 
generation of students. At the same time, one also gathers the impression that tech-
nicalities of interconnectedness increasingly acquire a negative connotation in the 
light of a symbolical discourse that, opposing the former, tends to recreate an idea 
of separation that cannot be bridged, of a separation that inexorably slides toward a 
semantics of singularity and incommensurable distinction.
It is hard to determine what forces in the history of human cultures provoke the 
blossoming of utopias of connectedness and what other forces, on the contrary, push 
them toward an opposite idea of isolation and, ultimately, toward the feeling of being 
encircled by an incomparable, impenetrable cultural enclave. It cannot be denied, in 
any case, that this dialectics of expansion and contraction of the idea of connection 
exists, and unfolds according to patterns that are usually not linear but entail a num-
ber of paradoxical movements and convolutions.
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To recapitulate, the semantic range condensed into the proto-Indoeuropean root 
“*ned-” refers to the ontological existence, and the consequent phenomenologi-
cal appearance, of two or more entities, which are separated, but whose separation 
already potentially hints at the possibility of their connection, that is, at the possibil-
ity of somehow bridging the gap that creates the separation itself. The perception of 
the transient character of the separation, which coincides, symmetrically, with per-
ceiving the foreseeable character of the connection, depends on both the ontological 
and the phenomenological level.
5  Ontologies and Phenomenologies of Connectedness
At the ontological level, only a change in the material conditions of the separation 
allows the two or more distinct entities to be perceived under a different light, that 
is, under the light of a possible reconnecting. To give an example, the human voice 
was considered as having a range of diffusion essentially limited by the power of 
amplification (through horns, through minarets, or through other acoustic devices or 
settings) until the technological practice of its recording became viable and, between 
the  19th and the  20th century, current. From that moment on, the human voice has 
not been conceived anymore as inextricably imprisoned in the geography of a body, 
but detachable from it and able to be transported in a completely different space and 
time. Today, there are no more limits for the human voice and its contents of expres-
sions and emotions to be transplanted in a distant space and into a distant time (with 
the limitation that only the future, and not the past, is open to this transportation: we 
cannot send voices back to the past).
At the phenomenological level, however, the transient character of a separation 
is seen somehow in relation to the ontological level, but with a certain degree of 
independence. A separation that is ontologically transient can appear as perma-
nent, and vice versa. The first mismatch was already exemplified through reference 
to interstellar traveling: probably, the technical conditions necessary to reach some 
remote areas of the universe will never be at the disposal of human beings; despite 
this ontological limit, due to such rocky facts as, for instance, the speed of light or 
other physical conditions, nothing can prevent human beings from dreaming about 
reaching, through imaginary technologies, the limits of the universe, and see with 
their eyes the beginning of it.
On the opposite, two entities that are perfectly bridgeable from the ontological 
point of view, through as simple a technology as a bus, for instance, can become 
phenomenologically very distant when a symbolical discourse of distinction and sin-
gularity seeps into their perception. The current disintegration of the idea of a uni-
fied Europe, for instance, is certainly not due to the ontology of geographic and lin-
guistic frontiers: we dispose of translation machines that perform increasingly well; 
our trains and planes are faster and cheaper than ever. Nevertheless, despite this 
ontology of connectedness, and perhaps paradoxically also because of it, a discourse 
of singularity starts to take momentum in the gap between spaces and societies: “we 
shall never understand them”; “they shall never be like us”; an agency of disconnec-
tion inevitably ensues, and seeks to transform the ontology of the relation so as to be 
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in line with the phenomenological perception of it: ultimately, the reestablishment 
of passport controls among countries of the Schengen area comes down to that: we 
perceive ourselves as non-connectable, therefore we must disconnect us.
6  Agencies of Connectedness
Along this line, it is time to formalize that which has continuously been hinted at 
in the last paragraphs, that is, the idea that, in the semantics that is enshrined by 
the proto-Indoeuropean root “*ned-”, there is not only the possibility of a dialec-
tics between the concept of a bridgeable separation and that of an unredeemable 
singularity, a dialectics that evolves through expansions and contractions as well as 
through a complex intertwining of matter and discourse, structural conditions and 
symbolical connotations; the semantics of connectedness also contains a fundamen-
tal idea of agency [10]. “*Ned-” and its derivatives indicate that two separate items 
exist, and that they can be reconnected at both the ontological and the phenomeno-
logical level, but also that a force is necessary in order for this change in the level 
of connection of things to take place. “Nahyati” [“binds, ties”]; “nodus” [“knot”]; 
“nascim” [“I bind, I oblige”]; “net”, [“netting, network”]: in all old Indo-European 
languages, the idea emerges that, through the exertion of an appropriate agency and 
its force, the separateness of things can be transformed, so that two or more entities 
that were hitherto far from each other become closer or even merge into a mystical 
fusion.
The semantics of this connecting agency (which is contrasted, throughout history, 
by an opposite semantics of disconnecting agency) comprises two versions: in the 
radical version, the human agency is such that it can affect directly the ontology of a 
separation, according to the idea that this separation is actually not such at a deeper 
level, and therefore calls for an effort that realigns the phenomenology of things to 
their ‘real’ ontological substratum. This complex philosophical formula grasps phe-
nomena that are indeed quite common, such as the utopia, quite frequent in certain 
historical periods, according to which the apparent variety of human beings is noth-
ing but a superficial, super-structural feature, underneath which a common ground 
can be found. The second and less radical version does not posit a commonality of 
separated entities at an ontological level, but implicitly claims that, in the way they 
appear, that is, at the level of their phenomenology, an agency can be exerted so that 
previously distinct items might look as united or, at least, as closer.
7  Grounds of Connectedness
In both versions, a semiotic perspective on separation spontaneously arises. Even 
in the assumption of the separation of two or more things, indeed, a semiotic logic 
must somehow take place, and indicate to the beholder according to which particu-
lar angle the connection might take place. That which is here analytically exposed 
is actually characterized by synthetic simultaneity: when we consider two entities 
as separated, and when we plan and then establish a connection, we are implicitly 
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looking at these two entities as signs of such connection. Framing them according 
to Peirce’s semiotics is enlightening: entities are seen as objects in relation to which 
the idea of a connection selects a ground, on whose basis objects are, then, turned 
from static ontological items into dynamic objects, that is, into the origin of a phe-
nomenology that is subsequently grasped by the semiotic agency of an interpretant.
The two versions described above differ because the former considers that the 
connection takes place at the level itself of the grounds, whereas the latter esteems 
that the connection is rather established at the level of the interpretants. To give an 
example: in the marketing of the cell phone industry first, and then in that of social 
networks, company mottos and advertising slogans have often emphasized the value 
of connection. Nokia’s motto used to be “Connecting People”; Facebook’s slogan is 
“Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life”. In both sen-
tences, human beings are not considered with attention to their unbridgeable singu-
larities but as objects (in the Peircean sense of the term) from which the marketing 
discourse of these two companies selects a specific ground, that of the possibility 
and potentiality of interconnectedness. The slogans do not say what in particular, in 
human beings, they are going to connect. They do not specify whether, for instance, 
they are going to connect people with the same skin color, or with the same gen-
der, or with the same political ideology. They more generally posit the universal 
interconnectedness of human beings, the fact that they are ontologically inclined 
to connection and that these two technological and commercial endeavors, a cell 
phone company and a social network service, will allow them to express this natural 
inclination.
These and similar slogans do not claim, like certain political ideologies of the 
past would do, that human beings are all equal, which was asserted by Enlighten-
ment and the French Revolution at the civil and political level and by Marxism at the 
social and economic level. Political agendas of unity would emerge from such ide-
ologies, while the ideology of connectedness implicitly suggests that human beings 
are actually different but also that the separatedness among them can be somehow 
bridged through the power of technology. Both Enlightenment and Marxism would 
advocate for a semantic reunification of the humankind, in terms of either juridical 
or economic discourse; the marketing of cell phones and social network services, on 
the contrary, preaches a syntactic reunification of the humankind, in which no spe-
cific content is attributed to the connection among people.
8  Rhetorics of Connectedness
Another rhetorical feature of these and germane slogans that is worthy of considera-
tion is their tendency to hide or downplay the energy that the connection requires. In 
both the abovementioned slogans, the image takes shape of a connection that natu-
rally establishes itself among people, as if they were spontaneously predisposed to 
that. The discourse of these slogans captures the essence of human beings as signs 
whose ground is the incoercible drive to get together. Both slogans, however, fail 
to emphasize that which is implicit in the semantics of the proto Indo-European 
root “*ned-”: establishing a connection requires both an agency and an effort. Most 
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derivatives of this root, indeed, refer to material or metaphoric devices of netting, 
such as knots or binding contracts. In the currently prevailing rhetoric of the net-
work, instead, the knots disappear; that which remains is the result of knotting, the 
effect of this binding agency, force, and effort.
Refocusing on the knots, rather than on the network, allows one to retrieve two 
essential phenomenological features of the former: first, a connection is not only a 
spontaneous dynamic, caressing the natural inclination of things toward each other, 
but also a form of coercion, repressing the sometimes equally spontaneous tendency 
of things to separate from each other. The joyous marketing of social network ser-
vices highlights the sparkle of the connection, as a result of which hitherto sepa-
rated human beings magically start being part of a relation; this marketing, however, 
implicitly conceal a fundamental feature of every connection: it takes a lot of effort 
to keep human beings together, and such an effort cannot be uniquely syntactic, it 
must be a semantic one. It must, in other terms, downward explore the several lay-
ers of the human existence of an individual in order to ascertain if and when it can 
establish a connection with another human being, and whether this connection can 
be considered a more or less permanent one.
This argument brings us back to the beginning of this essay, that is, to the popu-
larity of such expressions (and ideas) as that of ‘total interconnectedness’ or ‘being 
connected to the whole’. When such or similar clichés of present-day mysticism pop 
out in casual bar conversation, the suspect arises that they are not actually prompted 
by familiarity with some sort of philosophical or religious holism, but that they are 
rather the new-age counterpart of the rhetoric of connection underpinning the mar-
keting of social networks. In philosophical holism, instead, the idea—and the corre-
sponding feeling—of ‘being connected with the whole’ stems from an excruciating 
study of both the whole and the self. The kind of holism that Buddhism encourages, 
for instance, is deeply based not on an abstract, syntactic idea of connection, but 
on a specific and semantic realization of suffering as binding link among all living 
and non-living creatures: I feel part of a whole encompassing the entire universe 
because a long and painful reflection has led me to realize how all beings share the 
same feature, from rocks to mammals, and such feature becomes the ground through 
which all these beings turn into as many rings of a common semiotic chain. Simi-
larly, in Christianity, the connection that binds a community together is not generic 
but based on the idea of a sacrifice of oneself that, after the image of the supreme 
sacrifice of God-Christ, allows the community itself to take place.
Social network mysticism, on the contrary, albeit claiming for itself a quasi-mys-
tical pedigree, is not a semantic but a syntactic one. It is not based on a thorough 
examination of the world and on the discovery of a level at which it is all under-
pinned by the same logic but relies on the evidence of a purely syntactic connection. 
Lacking any semantically specific substratum, the idea of connection that expresses 
itself in digitally-inspired mysticism is essentially empty. I feel connected to the 
whole, but I could not explain how. Two pernicious ideological features emerge 
from this pseudo-mystical posture: first, the ideology of total connectedness shares 
many of the features of the ideology of total analogy, of that ‘analogical demon’ 
that deconstructionism has somehow embodied and that semiotics has sought 
to criticize and unmask in all its guises. Second, both ideologies (total syntactic 
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interconnectedness and total symbolical analogy) essentially voice a kind of hypo-
critical egotism: when present-day digital pseudo-mystics affirm to be “connected 
to the whole”, the suspect arises that they are implicitly suggesting that “I am the 
whole, and I do not care about the rest”.
9  Conclusions: The Limits of Digital Interpretation
An alarming increase in hoaxes, false rumors, and conspiracy theories characterizes 
most contemporary societies. Truth itself as supreme value in social conversation is 
disquietingly being replaced by other elements, such as the fun of trolling practices 
or the efficacy of populist rhetoric. More and more, interpreters revel in the belief 
that secrets are kept everywhere, and that abstruse hypotheses must be concocted so 
as to unveil the inner core of social reality. This trend is leading the contemporary 
episteme to a chaotic, non-functional condition, prone to gullibility, mistrust, and 
aggressiveness.
It is increasingly urgent to rationally expose the cultural mechanisms of mystifi-
cation so as to underline the social need that they currently fulfil and propose via-
ble antidotes to them. Since the 1970s, semiotics has been adopted as a discipline 
able to debunk the pernicious rhetoric of irrational persuasion; yet, the current state 
of the social and political discourse requires semiotics and the other humanities to 
undertake a further effort of meta-analysis: they are called to debunk not only the 
traditional rhetoric of the establishment, but also the unconventional rhetoric of the 
anti-establishment. Required to operate this constant, and at times paradoxical, dou-
ble debunking, social analysts must come up with new, sophisticated tools of cul-
tural decoding.
Increase in the number and density of connections among human beings enabled 
by technologies of digital and telematic communications, as well as the unprece-
dented speed, rhythm, and volume of contents that can be exchanged through such 
new networks, has led to, is bringing about, and is likely to be conducive in the 
future too to fruitful interactions among human beings at every level: it is easier than 
ever to share knowledge, emotions, and plans of actions with other fellow human 
beings, independently from where in the globe they have their physical abode. 
Examples are countless; in the domain of scholarship and academia, for instance, it 
has never been so easy to get in contact with fellow researchers at the four corners 
of the planet, interact with them through emails, social networks, and video-con-
ferences, team together for common goals, organize communities and projects that 
stretch across cultural, linguistic, and national frontiers. The most important advan-
tage that this global digital community has entailed is the possibility to test one’s 
ideas, hypotheses, and interpretations not only within a limited circle of collabora-
tors, but with a selected network whose members are scattered throughout the world.
If reasonableness is the potentiality of sharing meaning and interpretations within 
an intersubjective framework, through a common metalanguage, and according to an 
established methodology, as the etymology itself of the word “reasonability” sug-
gests, then the new digital and telematic technologies of communication, includ-
ing social networks, present scholars around the world with an unprecedented but 
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healthy challenge, that of probing the penetration of new ideas not only in the lim-
ited semiosphere of one’s restricted club of intellectual acolytes, but with the entire 
world. That might prove extremely refreshing for thinkers who seriously engage in 
the task of either constructing a deep knowledge of human universals, both in natu-
ral and in social sciences or, complementarily, building an articulated typology and 
taxonomy of human differences. Serious biologists and philosophers, as well as seri-
ous anthropologists and historians cannot but rejoice at the dramatically enlarged 
spectrum of their scholarly interlocutors.
Those academics, essentially a bunch of scholastic epigones, who, on the con-
trary, the new globalization of knowledge found self-indulgently engrossed in the 
petty exercise of provincial self-righteousness and self-entitlement, could not but 
launch their outcry at the shattering of previous intellectual frontiers. Many philoso-
phers, with semioticians too among them, would previously thrive under the shelter 
of intellectual protectionism; their ideas would triumph and dominate, uncontested, 
and even be exported to intellectual colonies, often as academic counterpart of eco-
nomic and political imperialism, sort of new version of old religious missions. It 
proved sufficient, however, to seek to globalize such petty semiotics to realize that its 
pseudo-universal schemata would encounter insurmountable aporias when applied 
to other cultures and semiospheres, or that they could simply not be translated in 
some distant languages, a clear sign that their concepts had resulted more from local 
linguistic games than from serious confrontations with the empirical arenas of soci-
eties and cultures.
At the same time, the limits of digital reasonableness cannot be underestimated 
either. The infrastructure itself of social networks and digital communication, as it 
was pointed out earlier, encourages an increasingly syntactic understanding of con-
nectedness and connections, to the point that both the fact of being together with 
other people and the fact of being separated from them are valued, emphasized, and 
even made the object of radical political and pragmatic stances independently from 
the actual fundaments of such communities or immunities. The very practice of 
reasonability indeed implies the possibility of both federation and seclusion among 
human beings, but both are intrinsically related to the idea of a semantic ground. An 
invisible bond comes about among human beings, sometimes even solidifies into 
established networks, communities, and institutions, yet it is a bond that arises from 
the awareness of a shared ground. Distant physical points in societies start to be 
clustered into homogeneous areas of the semiosphere, not only at its kernel, but even 
at its experimental and revolutionary margins, precisely for people intentionally real-
ize that some of the texts and discourses that they circulate in the semiosphere itself 
actually overlap. In other words, in the pre-digital world, the sense of commonality 
and community is a consequence of the realization of sharing a semantic space, of 
producing texts and discourses in relation to the environment in a similar way.
Yet, with the proliferation of digital social networks and the ensuing acceptance 
of the idea of connection and connectedness, the cause-effect relation is reversed: the 
creation of a syntactic cluster brings about not a semantic community, but the illu-
sion of it. In pre-digital reasonableness, individuals would first sense that they could 
share part of their worldview and lifeform with others upon realizing the common-
ality of texts and discourses that they would inject in the semiosphere; this would 
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give rise to the possibility of testing one’s interpretations within the newly formed 
community, testing that would coincide with the spirit itself of communality, with 
the idea of giving up at least a modicum of one’s solipsism in order to create and 
maintain a connection. In digital reasonableness, on the opposite, since the network 
precedes the realization of semantic communality, interpretations that are tested in 
the common arena are usually cannibalized by the solipsism and individualism of 
others. In this semiotic environment, only negative contents can survive, like those 
blind fish that thrive in the dark bottom of the oceans. In a community that results 
from syntactic connectedness, a feeling of bondedness is exclusively begotten by a 
sense of common opposition. As soon as a positive content is ventured in this syn-
tactic arena, however, it is not received with hermeneutic sympathy but turned into 
a semantic scapegoat: syntactic networks, indeed, give rise to communities that sur-
vive only insofar they have an enemy, and as soon as they do not have one anymore, 
for instance because of the simple fact that they have defeated it, they must find or 
create a new one, or in the absence of such big external enemy, they keep creating 
internal scapegoats, whose continuous expulsion provides the only guarantee for the 
cohesion of the syntactic network.
The computability of connections and more and more also of the contents that 
they allow to spread and share, is enabled by digital technology but produces emerg-
ing effects that were not envisaged in the creation of their technical infrastructure: 
communities in the pre-digital world would of course rely on various methods, 
strategies, and traditions to test their internal cohesion and impact on the world; the 
capacity of a political group of “filling a square”, for instance, was a typical display 
of numeric force in the socio-political arena. Yet, attributing a precise value to such 
a display was complicated and subject to imprecisions, ambiguities, and, therefore, 
propaganda. At the end of a manifestation, it was never clear how many participants 
had taken part in it. The establishment and the anti-establishment would provide dif-
ferent figures, through different media, and increasingly adopting visual strategies 
so as to prove their reckoning and disprove that of the counterpart, within a rhe-
torical struggle that was often unbalanced along common infrastructural hierarchical 
asymmetries. The only mechanism truly enabling the countability of opinion was 
the electoral one, although with some margins of imprecisions in case of corrupted 
or contested ballots.
In digital arenas, elections take place every second, although most people do 
not even realize that they are constantly voting. The digitalization of connections 
and contents allows a precise estimate of the shape and fluxes of social networks, 
but with a distortion that is clearly a blatant social manifestation of the Heisenberg 
effect. The quantification of connections and trends, indeed, influences the creation 
of new connection and trends, with such an impact and speed that the actual content 
of what is measured and computed is relegated in the background in relation to the 
measurement and the computing itself. In the sphere of pre-digital reasonableness, 
a semantic community would seek to fill an urban space, and usually a square, so 
as to prove its quantitative force; in the digital sphere, on the contrary, where syn-
tactic communities are formed by contagion and memetic force more than through 
exchange of hermeneutic hypotheses of reasonability, squared are filled even before 
the emergence of a clear semantic commonality among those who physically 
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
A
u
th
o
r 
P
ro
o
f
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
 P
R
O
O
F
Journal : SmallExtended 11196 Article No : 9726 Pages : 14 MS Code : 9726 Dispatch : 21-5-2020
1 3
The Limits of Digital Interpretation: Semantic Versus…
participate in the demonstration. From the perspective of a pre-digital observer that 
is simply absurd, but from the point of view of a digital native that is common-
sensical: since people are able to form large syntactic connections in the web, they 
can also visually complement it with the picture of their proxemic filling a physical 
square, although they would never be able to give rise to a political party, not even 
to a movement, and sometimes not even to a political platform or trend. Political 
manifestations in the digital arena resemble more and more to flash mobs, they are 
actually flesh mobs, displays of digital coordination more than outcomes of shared 
convictions, assemblies that work as physical choreographies of a digital world in 
which people are attracted to a group more by the contagious measurement of its 
figures than by the ideas that it defends. Fashion, meant as shape that a culture takes 
in relation to random quantitative trends, becomes the main logic underpinning the 
creation of these flesh mobs, where the satisfaction of seeing oneself as part of a 
synchronized movement is actually more important than the motivations that caused 
it.
Although the dynamic of fashion is the most suitable one to explain how syn-
tactic communities take place without resorting to any real hermeneutic exchange, 
the metaphor is also imperfect in the sense that clothes still have a materiality that 
individuals propose in distinctive and increasingly individual styles, whereas ideas 
do not have shape or color and often do not give rise to an outward apparel. In most 
present-day western political arenas, it is increasingly difficult to tell where one 
belongs, to which community of beliefs, judging from appearances. What people 
share in most syntactic communities, indeed, is a negative image of other communi-
ties, for instance when they adopt as enemy another ethnicity, or religion, or pre-dig-
ital political stance. So called digital haters, from this point of view, do nothing but 
radicalizing a trend that is customary in the entire world of digital syntactic commu-
nities: therein, people are what they oppose, not what they propose.
The negative vacuity of the current digital sphere, and its disinclination to give 
rise to forms of positive exchange and digital reasonableness, is provoked by the 
technological infrastructure of digital networks of communication but it involves a 
market. The technology and the market are in a regime of co-dependency, stemming 
from the same macro-ideology. The main reason for which no semantic communi-
ties can really take shape in the current social networks depends on the fact that their 
computability is part of a monetization strategy. For such or such group of opinion 
might be important to count their members and force, but for the framework itself 
what matters the most is that people keep connecting and being quantified. It is as 
though, in a democracy, the voting system was actually owned by a private com-
pany, which is not interested in the actual result of the vote, and might, therefore, 
even play impartial about it, but is systemically inclined to urge people to vote over 
and over again, to find ever new connections, to yield to the rhetorical force of num-
bers, to follow trends and counter-trends according to swirling fashions, although 
that might entail generating more and more scapegoats, attacked with increasing 
virulence.
That is the main cause of disequilibrium in the determination of digital reasona-
bleness. As opinions and counter-opinions are heatedly proposed across the social 
networks, in the background lies a framework that, while formatting the exchanges, 
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while counting them, while monitoring them, while attributing a statistic value to 
them, while selling and buying knowledge of such value in a market whose features 
are not transparent to those who hold and voice the opinions themselves, while per-
forming all these tasks with seeming neutrality and impartiality, then, actually prof-
its not from the reasonable intercourse of semantic contents for the sake of reach-
ing a reasonable and hopefully long-lasting equilibrium but from the proliferation 
of connectedness itself and digital conversation therein. If politics is the domain of 
reasonable agreement, and law is the equilibrium that a community reaches through-
out its internal struggles, what the commercial framework of the present-day digi-
tal conversation really wants is that people keep connecting, and exchanging, and 
forming temporary clusters of contagion. Unfortunately, in the current digital world, 
unreasonable disagreement is much more profitable than reasonable agreement.
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